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"Te Pee" as in Taxpayer: Tribal
Severance Taxes-Canvassing the
Reservation-Do Tribes Have the
Power to Impose Severance Taxes on
Minerals Extracted on Non-Indian Fee
Lands Within the Reservation?
1. INTRODUCTION
During a scene in the 1991 motion picture "Dances With
Wolves," John Dunbar, a United States soldier living in the
Indian country of the 1860s west, equates the sound of a herd
of stampeding buffaloes to the roar of a thousand claps of
thunder.' Today, the roaring he would hear would more likely
be the sound of an oil tanker or a coal truck barreling across a
reservation highway. These trucks, like the buffalo, will not roar
across tribal lands forever. Tribal mineral resources are a de-
pletable source of tribal income. Tribes, put to the task of
developing autonomous economies, will no doubt try to exploit
them to their fullest potential before the resources are gone. One
means by which tribes can make the most of their natural
resources is through tribal severance taxes.
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,2 the United States
Supreme Court resolved any doubts concerning an Indian tribe's
power to impose mineral severance taxes. However, the geo-
graphic territory over which tribes have taxing power is uncer-
tain.' Merrion leaves unanswered two issues: (1) whether a tribe
has jurisdiction to impose mineral severance taxes on fee lands
within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, and (2) whether
I Dances With Wolves (Orion Pictures 1990).
2 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
1 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Merrion involved a
tribe's mineral severance tax imposed on a mineral lessee acting on tribal lands within
the confines of the reservation. The Tribe had not attempted to exercise jurisdiction to
tax over non-Indian fee land within the reservation, or over tribal land outside the
reservation. Thus, the Court had no reason to address these geographical issues.
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a tribe may impose severance taxes on lands which are charac-
terized as "Indian Country," but which are outside reservation
boundaries.
II. TIBAL JURISDICTION TO TAX-A NEED FOR DEFINITE
LIMrrs
Tribal tax jurisdiction over non-Indians is an issue which
calls for finite limits. "Jurisdiction, in general, is a definitive
thing. Certainty is an essential element." '4 Certainty in jurisdic-
tion is the starting point upon which parties determine the law
that governs their conduct.
Certainty of tax jurisdiction is especially important in the
area of tribal mineral leases. The value of a lease to both the
mineral lessee and the tribe may depend on whether the tribe
has jurisdiction to impose severance taxes. The potential impact
of a severance tax on either party can determine the economic
feasibility of the lease.
Modern Indian policy is forcing tribes to develop self-suffi-
cient economies.' A tribe that is dependent on mineral wealth
must be able to determine with some accuracy where it has the
power to tax if it is to plan effectively for its future. Also,
certainty of tribal tax jurisdiction may limit inhibitions of min-
eral lessees who are unsure about entering into leases with a
tribe. A mineral lessee needs to know where a tribe has jurisdic-
tion to tax so it can better evaluate the value of its leases. A
severance tax, even one of small percentage, may determine
whether a mine or a well will be profitable. Mineral lessees need
certainty since they are nearly completely exposed when a court
sustains tribal tax jurisdiction over a mineral estate that the
lessee has forecasted as outside tribal jurisdiction. Mineral les-
sees, as outsiders, cannot participate in tribal government. The
mineral lessee has little protection from abusive tribal taxation
outside that available in tribal court. 6 Except for tribal court
I Sonosky, State Jurisdiction Over Indians in Indian Country, 48 N.D.L. REv.
551, 557 (1971-72).
1 See infra notes 32 and 33 and accompanying text.
6 For instance, tribal mineral leases entered into pursuant to the Indian Mineral
Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (1988) may be for a term of ten years. If a
tribe enters into a ten-year lease and, prior to the termination of the ten-year period,
the market price of the mineral rises significantly, the tribe, by imposing higher severance
taxes, could make the lease economically infeasible. The tribe could use a tax to force
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remedies, a mineral lessee is left relatively defenseless in the
situation where tribal taxes imposed after the lease is made leave
the lease economically unattractive.
7
Mineral lessees also need to know the finite limits of tribal
jurisdiction so they can factor potential severance tax liability
into their business decisions. The mineral lessee must be able to
forecast whether it will be subject to tribal severance taxes should
the tribe attempt to unilaterally expand its jurisdiction by pur-
chasing fee land or by amending its constitution or tribal legis-
lation to assert broader jurisdiction.8
Congress has recognized the need to define jurisdiction with
respect to tribal criminal law, environmental law, child custody,
and other areas.9 Unfortunately, it has not spoken on the extent
of tribal jurisdiction to tax. Rather, the limits must be pieced
together through a history of conflicting case law. The limits
must be defined more concisely if tribes and mineral lessees are
to maximize the exploitation of tribal mineral resources.
III. FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY-HISTORY THROUGH A HALL OF
MIRRORS
Over the years, Congress, wielding the paddles of homestead-
ers, railroads, tribal rights activists, and others, has engaged
itself in a game of Indian policy ping pong, swinging back and
forth between policies of tribal autonomy and tribal assimilation
into mainstream American culture. The cumulation of these
alternating policies, one era overlapping the next, has created a
hall of mirrors from which to determine the extent of tribal
jurisdiction.
the first lessee out of the lease, and then enter a second, more profitable, lease with
another mineral lessee. The original lessee has little protection against such a tax outside
the remedies provided by tribal courts, or perhaps a "Texas Tea Party" in accordance
with another historical protest where taxpayers were subject to potentially abusive taxes
assessed by a government in which they were not represented.
See infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1115 n. 19 (1981)
(concerning a tribe's attempt to expand its jurisdiction to tax coal production on a ceded
strip by amending its constitution to provide such authority). Also, a tribe, acting as a
proprietor, could purchase an assignment of an unfavorable lease from a non-Indian
lessor, assert jurisdiction, and through its taxing power increase the payments due under
the lease to favor the lessor, thus taking from the mineral lessee the benefit of its
bargain.
I See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988) (defining federal criminal jurisdiction over
Indians involving ten major crimes); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(10) (1988) (tribe child custody
jurisdiction); 49 Fed. Reg. 38462 (1984) (defining tribal jurisdiction for purpose of the
SMCRA).
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Early nineteenth century policy toward Indians promoted
qualified separatism.' 0 Tribal governments, though subject to
federal supervision and support, were basically segregated from
outside interference." This qualified separatism satisfied tribal
desires to be left alone 2 and the Federal government's desire to
minimize conflicts between Indians and settlers. 3
Early separatism often involved removing tribes from the
eastern United States and relocating them in the unsettled land
in the West.' 4 Later, in response to the expansion of white
population into the West and notions of manifest destiny, federal
policy shifted to a reservation form of separatism, where tribes
were confined within fixed geographical boundaries. 15
As the nineteenth century progressed, congressional policy
toward Indians began to swing away from tribal autonomy as
the federal government assumed greater control over tribal mat-
ters. 16 By the 1870s, congressional policy had evolved from a
policy of separatism to one of assimilation.
17
Allotment of tribal lands was the most forceful method of
achieving assimilation.' Under the allotment program, tribal
lands were transferred from communal ownership to private
ownership by individual Indians, the rationale being that private
ownership would encourage tribal members to participate in
mainstream American culture. 19 Additionally, lands remaining
after all eligible Indians had received an allotment were opened
for non-Indian purchase or homesteading.
2 0
'0 C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, Tim, AND THE LAW 13 (1987) [hereinafter
WILKINSON].
Id. at 14-18.
,I Id. at 18.
' Id. at 14-18.
" F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78-79 (1982 ed.) [hereinafter
COHEN].
I Id. at 124.
I d. at 69-70.
I Id. at 127-143; WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 19.
COHEN, supra note 14, at 130-132; WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 19. Under the
General Allotment Act of 1887, also referred to as the Dawes Act. 24 Stat. 388 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 354) (1982), tribal lands were divided into
160-acre parcels to be held in trust by the United States government for the benefit of
individuals for a 25-year period. At the end of the 25.year period, title passed in fee to
the individual tribe members. The Act also provided that surplus land left after all
eligible Indians had received an allotment was subject to sale to homesteaders. The
proceeds of these sales were to be held in trust for the tribe.
" COHEN. supra note 14, at 130-132; WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 19.
COHEN, supra note 14, at 613.
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Congress abandoned the allotment program in 1934,21 but
not before a substantial portion of tribal lands had passed into
non-Indian ownership.? The allotment era left after it a confus-
ing "checkerboard" pattern of land ownership where non-Indian
fee parcels were often interspersed among tribal lands.
23
In the 1930s, federal policy swung back toward tribal auton-
omy. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) encouraged
economic development, self-determination, cultural plurality, and
the revival of tribalism.2 4 The IRA, in addition to eliminating
the allotment program, encouraged tribes to adopt constitutions
and to develop strong tribal governments.25 Other legislation of
the era encouraged the development of tribal natural resources
through mineral leases. 26
In the succeeding decades, policy once again shifted in favor
of assimilation. During the 1950s, a number of tribes were
terminated,2 7 and those that were not were subjected to increased
federal and state jurisdiction.
2
1
Current Indian policy has again reversed itself and now
favors tribal autonomy. Since the early 1960s, Congress has
promoted a policy of self-determination placing tribal develop-
ment in the tribes' own hands.29 Current policy limits the degree
of federal oversight, instead encouraging tribes to take control
over their own affairs. 0 Linked to increased tribal control, Con-
gress, by cutting back on federal funding, has ball-and-chained
an increased economic independence, where tribes are expected
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1988).
WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 151, n. 65. The allotment era had a devastating
impact on tribal landholdings in which tribal owned acreage dropped from 138 million
acres in 1887 to 52 million acres in 1934. Id. at 20.
2, WILKiNsoN, supra note 10, at 20.
, Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1982); COHEN,
supra note 14, at 147-49.
25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988).
See Omnibus Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. § 396(a)-(g) (1982).
V See generally COhEN, supra note 14, at 171-75; A. Watkins, Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, in DocutiNTs OF UNIrED STATES
INDIAN POLICY 238-39 (F. Prucha 2nd ed. expanded, 1990).
E.g., Public Law 280, (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-
26 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988); CoHEN, supra note 14, at 152-53.
-, COHEN, supra note 14, at 180.
" See Ronald Reagan, Indian Policy (Jan. 24, 1983), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 301 (F. Prucha 2d ed. expanded, 1990).
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to cover a greater percentage of the costs of self-government.3'
Many tribes have looked to increased tribal taxation as a
means of meeting the costs of self-government. However, appli-
cation of differing federal Indian policies over the years has
resulted in confusing patterns of land ownership where tribes
hold beneficial or fee interests outside reservation borders, and
non-Indians hold fee interests within reservation borders. Addi-
tionally, application of federal Indian law poses difficulties since
a significant portion of Indian law was generated against a
backdrop of tribal policy which differs from the tribal policy of
today. These noncontiguous patterns of land ownership and the
confusing overlap of Indian policies and law create uncertainties
concerning the extent of tribal tax jurisdiction.
IV. TRrBA MrERxJ RESOURCES
Some tribes have responded to the call to develop autono-
mous economies by exploiting their mineral resources. Tribes,
acting in the role of proprietors, are generating revenues through
mineral rents and royalties. Additionally, acting in the role of
sovereign, tribes are generating revenues to cover governmental
costs through the implementation of mineral severance taxes.
3 2
Tribal mineral resources are a substantial source of potential
tribal income. Indian tribes hold beneficial ownership to ap-
proximately 200 billion tons of coal, which equates to about
one-third of the United States low sulfur western coal reserves,
4.2 billion barrels of oil, 17.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,
37 percent of known United States uranium deposits, and 4 to
5 percent of United States offshore hydrocarbon reserves, as
well as limited quantities of phosphate, copper, oil shale, and
other minerals.
3
For those tribes that hold beneficial interest in mineral re-
sources, tribal taxation represents a significant source of poten-
tial income. For example, the Navajo Tribe, through the
" See generally, Indians Seek Coal Development to Offset Federal Aid Cuts, 90
COAL AGE 19 (1985).
,2 See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 145-47 (1982) (distinguish-
ing Tribe's role as sovereign from that of proprietor).
3 See COHEN, supra note 14, at 531, n. 23; P. Frye, Leases and Permits on Indian
Land, RocKY MTN. Mm. L. FOUND. 2-1 (Jan. 1989); M. Yoder, Tribal and State
Jurisdiction to Enforce Environmental and Land Use Laws, RocKy MT. MiN. L.
FOUND. 4-6 (Jan. 1989).
[VOL. 7:73
TRmAL SEVERANCE TAXEs
imposition of severance taxes, possessory interest taxes, and
business activity taxes, generated approximately $50,000,000 in
tax revenues over a recent two-year period. 4 Undoubtedly, In-
dian tribes, faced with increasing governmental costs and de-
creasing federal support dollars, will broadly assert tribal tax
jurisdiction as a means of maximizing tribal revenues.
V. EMERGING ISSUES OVER TRIBAL JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE
SEVERANCE TAXES
Indian lands contain vast quantities of mineral wealth."
Modern federal policy encourages tribes to exploit these re-
sources as a means of developing economies which are less
dependent on federal funding. 6 The geographic jurisdiction over
which tribes may exploit their natural resources through taxation
is subject to considerable uncertainty. To date, neither Congress
nor the courts have directly addressed the extent of tribal juris-
diction to tax tribal lands outside the reservation boundaries or
tribal jurisdiction to tax fee lands inside reservation boundaries.
Recently, in the Tenth Circuit, a mining company challenged
a tribe's power to tax "source gains" from mineral activity on
lands which, though possibly classified as Indian Country, are
outside reservation boundaries. 37 Resolving a preliminary issue,
the court held the lands in question were, indeed, outside res-
ervation boundaries, but left undecided the issues of whether
the lands were Indian Country, and if so, whether the Federal
District Court had to stay its resolution of the tribal jurisdiction
issue until the tribal court had made a decision on the issue.3 8
These preliminary issues had to be resolved before the court
could decide the ultimate issue-the validity of the tribe's juris-
diction to tax mineral activity outside reservation boundaries.
Tribal jurisdiction to tax intra-reservation fee lands is unclear
given the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Bren-
dale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Na-
tion.39 The Court in Brendale, unable to reach a majority opinion,
' D. Israel, Tribal Taxation of Reservation Mineral Development, ROCKY MTN.
Mrn. L. FOUND. 12-7 (Jan. 1989).
" Supra note 33.
Merrion, 455 U.S. 130; supra note 33.
17 Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1422.
" Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989).
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offered three widely divergent opinions concerning tribal juris-
diction to zone fee lands within the reservation. A tabulation of
the votes sustained the tribe's authority to zone fee lands on
portions of the reservation which had retained Indian character,
but precluded the tribe from zoning another area that, because
of expansive settlement by non-Indians, had lost its Indian char-
acter.4 It is uncertain whether the Court, deciding tribal juris-
diction to tax, would reach the same result.
VI. MERPoJN v. JcAILA APACHE TRIBE-TRIBAL POWER TO
IMPosE SEVERANCE TAXEs
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,4 the Supreme Court
sustained the tribe's imposition of mineral severance taxes on
non-Indian mineral lessees. The Jicarilla Apache Tribe, pursuant
to its constitution, had imposed a tax on "any oil and natural
gas severed, saved and removed from tribal land." 4 Twenty-one
oil and gas lessees challenged the tribe's tax.4 1 The Supreme
Court upheld the tax, stating the power to tax was an essential
attribute of tribal sovereignty."
The majority in Merrion focused on the tribe's power inher-
ent in its status as a sovereign, rather than on its power to
exclude nonmembers.4 The tribe's power to tax stems from its
status as a sovereign, and incidental to that status, its authority
to control economic activity within its jurisdiction, and its need
to defray the cost of governmental services by requiring contri-
butions from those persons or enterprises who are engaged in
economic activities within that jurisdiction."
"'Id.
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
I d. at 136. The tax was adopted pursuant to the Tribe's constitution which
granted the tribal council the authority "subject to approval by the Secretary of the
Interior, to impose taxes and fees on nonmembers of the tribe doing business on the
reservation." Id. at 135 (citing Revised Constitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, art.
XI § 1(e)).
' Merrion, 455 U.S. at 133.
I d. at 140-41. The Court's holding sustained the Tribe's authority to impose
severance taxes as a power inherent to Tribal sovereignty. A majority of the Court
indicated, in dicta, that the authority to tax also stemmed from the Tribe's power to
exclude nonmembers. Id. at 144-48. The dissent argued that where the Tribe had entered
leasing agreements with non-Indian lessees, it had contracted away its power to exclude,
and accordingly its power to tax. Id. at 186 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 140-42.
1d. at 137, 144.
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The tribe's authority to tax extended to non-Indians who
engaged in commercial dealings with the tribe. The tribe's com-
mercial partners "availed themselves of the 'substantial privilege
of carrying on business' on the reservation." 47 They enjoyed the
benefits of tribal "police protection and other governmental
services, as well as from 'the advantages of a civilized society." "' 4
Where a nonmember accepts benefits incidental to its trade with
the tribe, it subjects itself to the tribe's taxing authority to help
defray the cost of those benefits. 9
Notably, the Court held that the contractual relationship
between the tribe and the mineral lessees did not undermine the
tribe's sovereign power to tax. 50 The Court distinguished the
tribe's proprietary role as a commercial partner from its govern-
mental role as a sovereign.5 Thus, a tribe, on one outstretched
palm, may generate rents and royalties in its capacity as a
mineral lessor, and on the other, raise revenues through its
sovereign tax authority.
The Court rejected the mineral lessee's argument that Con-
gress had divested tribes of the power to impose severance taxes.52
Congressional legislation delegating to the Secretary of the In-
terior approval power over tribal leases did not preempt tribes
of the authority to impose severance taxes.5 3 Nor did a prior Act
that allowed states to impose severance taxes on mineral lessees
on Executive Order Reservations. 54 Neither Act contained any
clear indication that Congress had implicitly divested the tribe
of its authority to tax, and any ambiguities in construction of
the Acts were to be construed in favor of the tribe.
55
,7 Id. at 137 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 437
(1980); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940)).
4a Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137-38 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue,
447 U.S. 207, 228 (1980); quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434, 445 (1979)).
49 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137-38. The Tribe's interest in taxing is greatest "when
the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services." Merrion, 455 U.S. at 138 (citing
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
156-57 (1980)).
" Merrion, 455 U.S. at 145-48.
I d. at 145-46.
'= Id. at 150-52.
Id. at 150 (referring to the Omnibus Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25
U.S.C. § 396(a)-(g) (1982)).
I4 d. at 150-51 (referring to the Act of March 3, 1927, 25 U.S.C. § 398(a)-(e)
(1982)).
" Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, at 152 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980)).
1991-92]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
Likewise, the Court rejected the lessee's contention that the
tax violated the negative implications of the Commerce Clause.
5 6
The Indian Commerce Clause was intended as a protection,
rather than a restraint upon tribes.17 The Court questioned the
application of the Interstate Commerce Clause to Indian tribes,
but stated that even if it did apply, the tribe's tax did not violate
it.sa
The Merrion opinion resolves any doubts concerning a tribe's
power to impose severance taxes within its jurisdiction. 9 How-
ever, the opinion does not establish precisely what constitutes
tribal tax jurisdiction. Merrion involved non-Indian lessees who
entered into consensual agreements with the tribe and conducted
activity on tribal trust land within reservation boundaries 0 The
opinion leaves undecided whether the tribe has tax jurisdiction
over non-Indian activity within reservation boundaries, but on
non-Indian-owned fee land and through mineral leases with non-
Indian fee owners. Likewise, though recognizing that "there is
a significant territorial component to tribal power,' '61 the Court
left unresolved whether tribes may impose severance taxes on
non-Indian lessees operating on tribally related lands that are
located outside the geographic boundaries of the tribe's reser-
vation.
VII. LEGAL RESTRANTS ON TRmAL TAXATION
Tribal taxation, as compared to that of states, is relatively
unrestrained. Non-Indians who have some nexus with a tribe,
either through business contacts or activity within tribal geo-
graphic jurisdiction, have limited grounds on which to challenge
tribal taxes, save the remedies available in tribal courts.
6 2
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 153-56.
I' Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 153 (construing U.S. COMST. art. I § 8, cf. 3), 155 n. 21. The Interstate
Commerce Clause did not apply where Congress had affirmatively provided other
checkpoints, such as Secretary of the Interior approval, that must be met before the tax
can take effect. Id. at 155. Cf. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985)
(Court upheld tribal severance tax imposed without Secretary of the Interior approval.).
" Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141.
0 Id. at 133-35. The tribe's constitution extended tribal taxing authority to "non-
members .. .doing business on the reservation." Id. at 135. (emphasis added) (citing
Revised Const. of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, art. XI § l(e)). The mineral lessees
challenging the tribe's tax were leasing tribal lands within the reservation. Id.
61 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 142.
1 See infra notes 65-80.
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A. Constitutional Restraints on Tribal Taxation
As a general rule, United States constitutional restraints on
state taxation are inapplicable to Indian tribes.63 Constitutional
provisions traditionally applied to curb abusive taxation are di-
rected only at the federal government and at the states, and are
silent with respect to Indian tribes.61
More specifically, the Supreme Court has indicated that
Commerce Clause restrictions may not apply to tribal taxation.65
In Merrion, upholding a tribal severance tax, the Court stated
the Indian Commerce Clause was intended to provide Indians
with federal protection from state and local interference, and
not to impose a restriction on tribal power.6 The Court held
the Interstate Commerce Clause did not apply where Congress
had affirmatively provided checkpoints, such as Secretary ap-
proval, that must be met before a tribal tax becomes valid.6 7 In
Conoco, Inc. v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes,6 the Court
stated that portions of the Interstate Commerce Clause test that
applied in challenges to state taxes did not apply to tribal taxes.
B. Common Law and Statutory Restraints on Tribal Taxation
While constitutional restraints on abusive taxation do not
apply to tribes, the underlying principles may be applicable as a
11 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-58 (1978); Trans Canada Enter.
v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1980); CoHEN, supra note
14, at 664-66.
" U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 (negative implication of Commerce Clause generally not
applicable to tribes, infra nn. 65-68); U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (Due Process Clause and
Takings Clause restrictions of federal government); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § I (Due
Process Clause limitation on states); U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2 (Privileges and Immunities
Clause a limitation on states).
" Merrion, 455 U.S. at 153-54 (citing Brief for Secretary of Interior 35-40); Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191 (1989) (supporting contention in
amnicus curiae briefs that "Indian tribes are not States within the meaning of the
Commerce Clause."). Cf. Conoco, Inc. v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, 569 F. Supp.
801, 807-08 (D. Wyo. 1983) (applying Commerce Clause analysis to determine validity
of tribal severance tax).
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 153-54.
Id. at 154-55.
Conoco, Inc., 569 F.Supp. 801, at 807-08 (referring to Merrion). The Brady test
is the Interstate Commerce Clause test applied to ascertain the constitutionality of state
taxes. The elements of the test include the following: (I) the activity must have a
substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) the tax must be fairly apportioned among
each taxing sovereign, (3) the tax cannot discriminate against interstate commerce, and
(4) it must fairly relate to the services provided by the state. Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453
U.S. 609 (1981) (applying test to state mineral severance tax).
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matter of common law. The Court in Merrion allowed tribal
taxation of nonmembers only where the nonmember had entered
tribal lands or conducted business with the tribe. 69 Additionally,
the Court justified the tax on the ground that the taxpayers were
the recipients of tribal governmental services.7" A taxpayer's
nexus with the taxing sovereign and a taxpayer's receipt of the
sovereign's governmental services are requirements under both
Due Process and Commerce Clause analysis. 71 Where a tribe
provides no services to a non-Indian, or where a tribe has no
nexus to the non-Indian, common law principles may preclude
the imposition of tribal taxes.
Although restraints on taxation imposed by the United States
Constitution will not likely apply directly to tribal taxation,
Congress has statutorily applied many of the same protections
through the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 72 Non-Indians may
challenge tribal taxes under the ICRA's taking clause or under
its due process clause. 73 However, a non-Indian contesting a
tribal tax under ICRA must do so in tribal courts as federal
courts are without jurisdiction to enforce such claims.
74
Other congressional legislation offers some limited protection
to non-Indian mineral lessees. Tribes imposing taxes pursuant to
tribal constitutions enacted under the Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA) are in many instances subject to self-imposed clauses
requiring that the Secretary of the Interior approve the tax. 75
However, not all tribes have adopted constitutions under the
IRA, and some of those that have did not include clauses calling
for Secretary approval of taxes. Taxation by a tribe, acting
without a tribal constitution requirement for Secretary approval,
has been sustained by the United States Supreme Court.
76
'9 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 142. "[A] tribe has no authority over a nonmember until
the nonmember enters tribal lands or conducts business with the tribe." id.
70 Id. at 139-42.
J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 289 (1986) [here-
inafter NowAK].
'2 Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
73 25 U.S.C. § 1302(5), (8).
" Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-59 (1978); UNC Resources v.
Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358, 361 n. 3 (D.N.M. 1981) ("[The ICRA ... by its terms
creates no means through which a party to a civil suit in tribal court can invoke federal
protection of his rights."); COHEN, supra note 14, at 668-69.
" See, e.g., Revised Const. of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, art. XI § l(e) cited in
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 135.
11 Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
[VOL. 7:73
TRIBAL SEVERANCE TAXEs
Congress has also indirectly imposed control over tribal sev-
erance taxes by requiring Secretary approval of mineral leases
and other mineral related agreements. 7 Presumably, the heavy
hammer of Secretary approval over future mineral agreements
will inhibit a tribe from imposing arbitrary or unfair taxes.
As an additional precaution against potential tax abuse, min-
eral lessees can contract against the imposition of severance
taxes. However, should a tribe breach such a contract term, it
is doubtful the mineral lessee would have a remedy.
78
Presumably, where a non-Indian mineral lessee challenges a
post-lease imposition to a severance tax, the court hearing the
action should review the tax under some degree of heightened
scrutiny. Where a tribe is operating both as a sovereign and as
a mineral lessor, its governmental action is entitled to less def-
erence. 9
As indicated above, constitutional challenges to tribal taxa-
tion have generally failed.A0 Likewise, arguments that tribal tax-
ation has been preempted by extensive congressional activity
concerning tribal leases, railroad legislation, state jurisdiction,
and other issues have generally failed to win over the courts.8'
In sum, to the typical mineral lessee's chagrin, it will have limited
grounds on which to challenge a tribal severance tax in the
familiar setting of state or federal court. More likely, the mineral
lessee will be forced to assert its claim in a tribal court which,
of course, will be applying tribal law. 2
VIII. TRIBAI JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE SEVERANCE TAXEs ON
FEE LAND WImm RESERVATION BOUNDARIES
Do tribes have jurisdiction to impose mineral severance taxes
on non-Indian-owned fee lands within the reservation bounda-
" See, e.g., Omnibus Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. § 396(a)
(1988); Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988).
" CoEN, supra note 14, at 437, n. 71.
" NowAK, supra note 71, at 391, n. 46.
Supra notes 67-70.
1" See, e.g.. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 150-52 (Tribe's tax not preempted by federal
Indian leasing legislation or federal energy pricing regulation); Burlington Northern R.R.
v. Fort Peck Tribal Exe. Bd., 701 F. Supp. 1493, 1503-04 (D. Mont. 1988) (Tribe's tax
authority over railroad easements not preempted by federal railroad legislation).
" The author intends no disrespect to the integrity of tribal courts, but merely
recognizes the fact that the typical non-Indian mineral lessee would generally rather
litigate its claim in the more familiar setting of the federal court system.
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ries? The recent Supreme Court case of Brendale v. Confeder-
ated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,83 discussing
tribal jurisdiction through a lively debate of three differing op-
inions, failed to clearly delineate the limits of tribal tax author-
ity.
IX. BRENDALE V. CONFEDERATED TIBEs AND BANDs OF
YAKrMA INDLAN NATION
Brendale involved a zoning dispute over fee lands within the
confines of the Yakima reservation. The dispute involved two
parcels of fee land, one of which was located in a "closed"
portion of the reservation, where title was held nearly exclusively
by the federal government in trust for the benefit of the tribe.
The other fee parcel at issue was located on an "open" portion
of the reservation where a sizable percentage of the property
was held in fee by non-Indians. The Court was unable to reach
a majority opinion. The plurality's judgment upheld the tribe's
authority to zone fee parcels in the closed areas of the reserva-
tion, but precluded tribal authority over fee lands in the open
area.8
A. The White Rule: Tribal Power Inherently Divested
Four Justices, in an opinion drafted by Justice White, opined
that absent a showing that the tribe's interests were imperiled,
tribal authority to zone non-Indian-owned fee land anywhere
within the reservation would be inconsistent with the tribe's
dependent status as landowner on the reservation, and therefore
divested." Justice White followed the principle set forth in Mon-
, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989).
Id. at 422-25.
" Id. at 425-26 (White, J.) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy,
JJ.). Justice White's opinion follows the general principle of tribal jurisdiction espoused
in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). In Montana, the Court, resolving the
issue of whether a tribe has jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing on fee lands
within a reservation, stated a "general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." Montana,
450 U.S. at 565. The Court recognized two exceptions to this general principle of
divestiture of tribal jurisdiction.
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
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tana v. United States that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is,
as a general rule, divested.e Justice White discussed both of the
exceptions expounded in Montana, but felt neither applied.87
The non-Indian fee owners, simply by virtue of their status, had
not entered consensual relations with the tribe., 8 Nor had the
tribe demonstrated that tribal zoning was necessary to protect
the political integrity, economic security, health or welfare of
the tribe. 9 Justice White construed Montana's second exception
narrowly, finding that its inclusion of the word "may" limited
its application." The exception did not apply where an outsider's
conduct might have an impact on the tribe, but rather only
where that conduct imperiled the tribe. 9' Where a tribe cannot
show its interests are imperiled, its power to regulate nonmem-
bers is divested. 92
B. Justice Stevens' Approach: One Little, Two Little, Three
Little Non-Indians ...
Justice Stevens' opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor, fo-
cused on the tribe's power to exclude, rather than the powers
stemming from tribal inherent sovereignty. 9 On the closed por-
tion of the reservation, the tribe had retained the power to
exclude nonmembers and the ability to define the character of
the area. Where a tribe retains the power to exclude, it neces-
sarily follows that the tribe may exercise the lesser-included
arrangements .... A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reserva-
tion when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); Morris
v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905)).
Montana, 450 U.S.at 565.
17 Brendale, 492 U.S. at 429-30. See n. 85 (stating Montana test).
, Brendale, 492 U.S. at 428. The parties agreed that there was no consensual
relationship between the Tribe and the fee owners.
,1 Id. at 429-30. Justice White argued that in the "open" area, tribal interests
were not imperiled and, thus, Montana's second exception did not apply. With respect
to the "closed" area, Justice White would have remanded the issue to Federal District
Court for a determination of whether tribal interests were imperiled. Id. at 3009.
I d. at 429.
Id. at 431. "The impact must be demonstrably serious and must imperil the
political integrity, economic security or the health or welfare of the tribe." Id.
92 Id.
" Brendale, 492 U.S. at 433 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring).
" Id. at 438-40.
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power to place conditions, such as zoning restrictions, on non-
members within that portion of the reservation. 9
Contrarily, the tribe no longer retained the power to exclude
nonmembers, nor to define the essential character on the "open"
portion of the reservation. Accordingly, in this area, the tribe
was without authority to impose zoning restrictions."
Justice Stevens' analysis turns on the demographic makeup
of the reservation. 97 In areas that are demographically Indian in
population and culture, the tribe retains the power to regulate
nonmembers. In areas that are demographically mixed, or largely
non-Indian, tribal powers are accordingly limited.
C. Votes Left: Broad Tribal Authority Over Non-Indians
The three remaining Justices, voicing their opinion through
the pen of Justice Blackmun, stated that the tribe retained its
zoning authority over all fee lands, regardless of reservation
demographics .98
Justice Blackmun contended that Justice White's reliance on
a general principle of divestiture of tribal authority was mis-
placed in light of earlier Supreme Court decisions which granted
broad tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. 99 Justice Black-
mun would find divestiture of tribal jurisdiction only in excep-
tional situations where the exercise of tribal authority necessarily
conflicts with the tribe's dependent status."00 Where, as in Bren-
dale, the exercise of tribal zoning was not inconsistent with the
overriding interests of the national government, it did not con-
flict with the tribe's dependent status.10 1 Accordingly, the tribe
retained zoning authority over the entire reservation.
0 2
Justice Blackmun continued, arguing that accepting Justice
White's construction as correct, the tribe would still retain the
" Id. at 434.
Id. at 444-45.
Id. at 438-46. "What is important is that the Tribe has maintained a defined
area in which only a very small percentage of the land is held in fee and another defined
area in which approximately halt of the land is held in fee." Id. at 437, n. 2.
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan J., and Marshall,
J.).
Id. at 450 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reser-
vation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980)).
' Brendale, 492 U.S. at 452 (emphasis in original).
O Id. at 452-53.
,I Id. at 451-52.
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power to zone under the second exception of the Montana test.10 3
Precluding the tribe from zoning fee lands would threaten the
tribe's political integrity, economic security, health or welfare,
since absent such power, the tribe would be unable to develop
a comprehensive system of land management.'"
Later in his opinion, Justice Blackmun discredited Justice
Stevens' opinion. Justice Blackmun argued that Justice Stevens'
demographic approach offers insufficient guidelines, would be
impractical to apply, and ignores the realities of Indian and
reservation life. 10S
X. APPLYING BRENDALE: TRIBAL AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE
SEVERANCE TAXES ON NON-INDIAN-OWNED FEE LANDS WITHIN
THE RESERVATION
The spectrum of opinions in Brendale provides little guidance
as to whether tribes have a pot of gold when their tax rainbow
touches ground on fee lands. It is uncertain which of the Bren-
dale opinions will carry the day should the Court review tribal
tax jurisdiction under a fact pattern similar to Brendale. It is
also uncertain whether, applying each of the Brendale opinions,
the outcome would be the same since the exercise of zoning
authority and taxing authority have differing impacts on tribal
political integrity, economic security, health, and welfare.
XI. MONTANA'S GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF DIVESTITURE-IS IT
GOOD LAW?
Courts applying the Brendale decision to the issue of tribal
severance taxes must first resolve the threshold determination of
whether Montana's general principle of divestiture of tribal au-
thority over non-Indians is good law. Justice Blackmun's and
Justice White's opinions on the subject sharply diverge.
10 6
Under Justice Blackmun's approach, a tribe may exercise its
authority over the activity of non-Indians within reservation
,01 Id. at 467-68.
-' Brendale, 492 U.S. at 456-58.
,01 Id. at 462-65. Justice Blackmun urges that Justice Stevens' reliance on congres-
sional intent behind the enactment of the Dawes Act in 1887 is misplaced in light of the
fact that the IRA of 1934 repudiated much of the earlier Act. Therefore, according to
Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens more appropriately should have relied on congressional
intent behind the 1934 Act.
11 Supra notes 93 and 100.
1991-921
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
boundaries whenever those activities "implicate a significant tribal
interest."' 0 7 Justice Blackmun contends Montana's general prin-
ciple of divestiture of power over nonmembers is anomalous to
traditional Indian jurisprudence.1 8 He adopts a different general
rule in which tribes retain complete authority over non-Indians
on the reservation, unless the exercise of authority is necessarily
inconsistent with their dependent status, such as where tribal
authority conflicts with the overriding interests of the national
government. 109
Justice Blackmun asserts that tribal authority over non-In-
dians is especially broad in the context of civil jurisdiction." 0 In
support of this assertion, he relies on Merrion and Colville, two
cases which affirmed tribal authority to impose taxes on non-
Indian activity on Indian reservations."'
However, neither Merrion nor Colville directly addressed
tribal taxing authority over non-Indians operating on fee lands
within the reservation. Colville sustained a tribe's power to
impose cigarette taxes on non-Indians who purchased tobacco
products from tribal retailers on trust lands."12 Merrion con-
firmed a tribe's power to impose severance taxes on taxpayers
who enter tribal jurisdiction either by transacting business with
the tribe or by operating on tribal lands, but the Court had no
occasion to determine whether tribal tax authority extended to
non-Indian activity on fee lands." 3
Thus, Merrion and Colville, which chronologically sandwich
Montana, are not inconsistent with the case's general principle,
Brendale, 492 U.S. 450.
,o Id. at 450, 455-56. "With respect to Montana's 'general principle' creating a
presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians absent express congressional
delegation, I find it evident the Court simply missed its usual way." Id. at 455 (Black-
mun, J.).
'° Id. at 452 (emphasis in original). Tribal powers that are necessarily inconsistent
with federal interests include the power to prosecute a non-Indian in a tribal court,
which does not afford the full protections of the Bill of Rights, the power to alienate
land to non-Indians, and the power to enter relationships with other sovereigns. Id.
(citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)).
10 Brendale, 492 U.S. at 453-54 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130 (1982) and Washington v. Confederate Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980)).
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 425-27.
" Colville, 447 U.S. at 152.
,z Merrion, 455 U.S. at 142.
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but fit squarely within its exception." 4 Both Merrion and Colville
involved situations in which non-Indians came onto the reser-
vation to conduct business with the tribe. Thus, in both cases
the taxpayer entered a consensual relationship with the tribe and
subjected itself to tribal jurisdiction. Neither of these cases upon
which Justice Blackmun relied weakens Montana's general prin-
ciple.
A turn of the century appellate court decision, Buster v.
Wright,"5 recognized a broader power of tribal taxing jurisdic-
tion over non-Indian business on fee land within the reservation.
Comparing tribal jurisdiction to that of other sovereignties, the
court stated that a tribe's jurisdiction over the inhabitants of a
reservation was not conditioned or limited by the title or occu-
pancy to the land and that a tribe was free to fix the terms on
which non-Indians could conduct business within its borders."1
6
The Buster opinion purported to allow tribal tax jurisdiction
over non-Indian business on the reservation regardless of whether
the non-Indian activity was conducted on tribal trust land or on
lands owned in fee by non-Indians."
7
It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile Buster with
Montana. At least one lower court decision has recognized this
and rejected Buster, stating that the Buster decision is wholly
inconsistent with the analysis in Montana and that had the
Supreme Court wished to follow Buster, to the exclusion of
Montana, it would have done so when it had the chance in
Merrion, which was decided just one year after Montana."8
XII. PRESUMPTIONS-TRIBAL DIVESTITURE OR TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY
Justice Blackmun states that the anomalous Montana deci-
sion "strangely reversed the otherwise consistent presumption in
11 Brendale, 492 U.S. at 427. Both Merrion and Colville involve situations where
the non-Indians subjected themselves to tribal jurisdiction by entering a consensual
relationship with the tribe or its members.
135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).
,, Id. at 951-52.
'" Id. It is ironic that Buster, which grants broad tribal tax jurisdiction over non-
Indians, was decided during an era in which congressional acts favored assimilation, see
supra notes 17-22, and Montana, which establishes a general principle of divestiture of
tribal authority over non-Indians, was decided during an era of tribal self-determination.
"I See Swift Transportation, Inc. v. John, 546 F. Supp 1185, 1191 n. 5 (D. Ariz.
1983).
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favor of inherent tribal sovereignty over reservation lands." 9
In support of his argument, he relies on Merrion and Iowa
Mutual Insurance v. LaPlante.20 However, both of these cases
involved a tribe's exercise of jurisdiction over a party who had
entered a consensual relationship with the tribe.
12'
It is not necessary to read Montana as reversing any pre-
sumption of inherent tribal sovereignty. Rather, these cases and
Montana can be reconciled such that the presumption of tribal
sovereignty arises only after it has been determined whether or
not the Montana exceptions apply. Where the exceptions do
apply, a presumption of tribal jurisdiction arises and the non-
Indian has the burden of rebutting it.22
"I Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 456 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
11 Id. at 454-55 (referring to Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130
(1982); Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987)).
121 Brendale, 492 U.S. at 454-55. See supra note 62 (discussing Merrion). In Iowa
Mutual, a tribe member employed by a non-Indian fee owner within the reservation
boundaries was injured while working. The insured, the employer, had a consensual
relationship with a tribe member. 480 U.S. 9 (1987). Justice Blackmun, contending that
Montana is an anomaly, pointed out that other post-Montana tribal jurisdiction cases
did not discuss Montana. In addition to Iowa Mutual, he cited New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983), and National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). Mescalero Apache dealt with a state's assertion of regulatory
jurisdiction on lands owned by the tribe and did not consider tribal jurisdiction over fee
lands. National Farmers Union did not turn on the extent of a tribe's inherent sover-
eignty. Rather, it held that challenges to tribal jurisdiction should be raised in the first
instance in tribal courts. Both Justices Blackmun and White cited United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), in support of their application of Montana. See Brendale,
492 U.S. at 427-28 (White, J.), 452 n. 3 (Blackmun, J.). Wheeler is not dispositive,
however, since it involved the criminal conviction of an Indian in tribal court and did
not have reason to discuss tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The language cited by
Justice White, "[tihe areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been
held to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian's tribe and
nonmembers of the tribe," and the language cited by Justice Blackmun that tribal
sovereignty is divested where "the dependent status of the Indian tribes within our
territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to
determine their external relations" 'is ambiguous. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 452, n. 3 (quoting
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)). It is not clear whether "those
areas" to which Justice White referred and "necessarily" to which Justice Blackmun
referred are meant to affirmatively preclude tribal jurisdiction in all situations, or merely
to distinguish Wheeler, a criminal jurisdiction issue involving an Indian defendant, from
prior cases involving other issues in which tribal power had been held to be divested.
Thus, it does not necessarily follow that the Court, by distinguishing Wheeler from
selected civil cases, meant to divest tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians as a general rule.
1 Reconciling Montana and subsequent cases in this fashion, a court hearing a
non-Indian challenge to tribal jurisdiction would first determine if the tribe's exercise of
jurisdiction falls within the Montana exceptions. If it does not, a presumption of
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Justice White's analysis in Brendale favors Montana's gen-
eral principle of divestiture. By finding a presumption only where
the Montana exceptions apply, it is possible to accept his reading
of Montana without conflicting with earlier case law defining
the general scope of tribal jurisdiction.
The Montana decision is rooted in an earlier Supreme Court
case, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, in which the Court
stated tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is divested where it
conflicts with the overriding interests of the national govern-
ment. 23 In Oliphant, the Court, noting the federal government's
policy of protecting the liberty of its citizens, precluded the tribe
from exercising criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian in tribal
court.1 24 As exemplified in the Bill of Rights, the United States
has manifested a great solicitude that its citizens be protected
against unwarranted intrusions into their personal liberty.' 21 The
tribal court, which was not subject to United States Constitution
requirements, provided no assurance that Oliphant, a criminal
defendant, would receive his constitutionally mandated protec-
tions.'2 6 Accordingly, the Court held that tribal criminal juris-
diction over the non-Indian was inconsistent with overriding
federal interests, and thus divested.1
2 7
The federal government, likewise, has a great interest in
protecting its citizens against unwarranted intrusions against their
property. 128 The power to tax is the power to take property.
Applying Oliphant analogously, a tribe's ability to make unwar-
ranted intrusions against the taxpayer's property, like such in-
trusions against a criminal defendant's liberty, is, as a general
rule, divested. 12 9
Justice White's analysis in Brendale follows the general prin-
ciple set forth in Montana. This is in agreement with the Court's
divestiture arises. If the exceptions do apply, no presumption arises, and the non-Indian
has the burden of disproving tribal jurisdiction-for instance, by showing that a con-
gressional act preempts a tribe's authority.
"I Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 565 (1981) (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
,1 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
125 Id.
- Id. at 211-12.
127 Id.
1' See UNC Resources v. Benally, 518 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (D. Ariz. 1981).
,29 But see Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (implying
liberty interests may be entitled to greater constitutional protection than property inter-
ests).
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opinion in Oliphant which limits tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. 30 Cases that have presumed a broader application of
tribal jurisdiction can be reconciled with Montana where they
fit within the Montana exceptions."' Accordingly, applying Justice
White's analysis in Brendale, as a general rule tribes are divested
of the power to impose severance taxes on mineral lessees op-
erating on fee land.
XIII. MONTANA'S FIRST EXCEPTION: TIE CONSENSUAL
RELATIONSHIP TEST
Tribal jurisdiction to tax non-Indians is not divested where
the non-Indian enters a consensual relationship with the tribe.
5 2
However, a mineral lessee leasing from a non-Indian on fee land
within the reservation has not entered into a consensual rela-
tionship with the tribe. The lease is presumably with the non-
Indian fee owner and it is executed outside the protective super-
vision of the Secretary of the Interior."' Thus, arguably, Mon-
tana's consensual relationship exception does not apply to these
leases, and a tribe cannot use the exception as a basis from
which to assert tax jurisdiction.
A. Consensual Relationship-Constructive or Implied
Relationships?
While technically the non-Indian lessee has no "consensual
relationship" with the tribe, there is some authority which sug-
"o Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
"' Supra note 122.
, Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 565 (1981).
" See Allotted Indian Leasing Act of 1909, 25 U.S.C. § 396 (1982) (applies to
lands allotted to tribe members); Omnibus Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25
U.S.C. § 396(a) (1988) (applies to tribal lands within reservation or lands owned by tribe
or its members individually); Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §
2101 (1988) (requires Indian tribe to obtain Secretary approval over agreements involving
lands held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the tribe or tribal lands subject
to restraints on alienation). See generally, Bailess v. Pakune, 344 U.S. 171 (1952).
See also Swift Transportation v. John, 546 F. Supp. 1185, 1193 (D. Ariz. 1982).
The United States District Court refused to accept the defendant's contention that "mere
presence within reservation boundaries is enough to allow tribal court jurisdiction." To
hold otherwise would defeat the "need to consider Montana's threshold distinction
between those reservation lands owned by Indians and those owned by non-Indians.";
COHEN, supra note 14, at 433-34, n. 27. Use of trust land by a non-Indian supplies a
tribal interest in the subject matter sufficient to confer jurisdiction. With fee lands the
interest must be based on other circumstances. Id.
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gests that the consensual relationship exception should be con-
strued more broadly in the area of tribal taxation than in other
exercises of tribal sovereignty.
In Merrion, the Court emphasized that tribal authority to
tax derived from a tribe's power to raise revenue for its govern-
mental services. 3 4 A tribe's authority is especially strong where
the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services. 5 A non-Indian
mineral lessee mining fee lands within reservation boundaries
may likely utilize tribal roads, utility services, police and fire
protection, and other tribal governmental services. Under such
circumstances, a mining company, by accepting such services,
could be said to have constructively entered into a consensual
relationship with the tribe. To hold otherwise would allow the
nonmember lessee to reap a windfall in the way of tribal services.
Additionally, Buster v. Wright expressly approves of tribal
taxation of non-Indian businesses' operation of fee lands.
13 6
While Buster is questionable law after the Montana decision, it
has been cited as authority in recent Supreme Court cases in
support of tribal jurisdiction to tax generally, implying some
vestiges of Buster remain.
3 7
Likewise, the Executive Branch has expressed its support of
broad tribal authority to tax nonmembers who accept the priv-
ileges of the tribe's trade or residence.
3 8
B. Consensual Relationship-Factoring in the Taxpayers'
Ability to Plan for Liability
In cases involving general civil jurisdiction over non-Indians,
as opposed to taxing jurisdiction, some lower court decisions
have construed the consensual relationship exception narrowly,
holding that the non-Indians' mere presence within reservation
boundaries did not constitute a relationship with the tribe.3 5
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137-39 (1982).
" Id. at 138.
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 951-52 (1905).
"' Merrion, 455 U.S. at 143; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980).
See POWERS OF INDIAN TRIBES, 55 I.D. 14, 46 (1934).
, United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984); Swift Trans-
portation v. John, 546 F. Supp. 1185, 1193 (D. Ariz. 1983); UNC Resources v. Benally,
514 F. Supp. 358, 363 (D.N.M. 1981). For cases finding a consensual relationship, see
FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314 (1990) (conferring tribal juris-
diction to enforce employment ordinance where the defendant had a consensual rela-
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One court has held a non-Indian tortfeasor causing injury
on the reservation had not implicitly entered into a consensual
relationship with the tribe.' 4° The court distinguished tortfeasors,
who have no control over the extent of their potential liability,
from merchants, who could limit their contractual liability by
limiting the extent of their trade with the tribe.'41
Tax jurisdiction over a mineral lessee operation of fee land
within the reservation is more analogous to the exercise of tribal
civil jurisdiction over a tortfeasor than that of jurisdiction over
a merchant. Although the mineral lessee, like the merchant, can
limit its tax liability by limiting the extent of its mining, this is
not a practical or economically feasible way to limit liability. A
mineral lessee that chooses to limit the impact of severance taxes
by cutting back on its production defeats the purpose of its
mineral lease. Thus, the mining company is more like the tort-
feasor, who has no control over the tribe's imposition of liability
over its conduct within reservation boundaries. Accordingly, like
the tortfeasor, a mineral lessee merely present within the reser-
vation boundaries has arguably not implicitly entered a consen-
sual relationship with the tribe.
C. Consensual Relationship Test-Conclusion
Is it difficult to predict whether a court facing the issue
would find that a nonmember operating on fee lands within the
reservation has constructively or impliedly entered a "consensual
relationship" with the tribe by accepting the governmental ben-
efits of civilized tribal society? The point was moot in Brendale
since the parties agreed that the non-Indian fee owners did not
have a consensual relationship with the tribe simply by virtue of
their status as landowners within reservation boundaries.1
4
1
In light of some lower court opinions in the civil jurisdiction
context, a court might be reluctant to find an implied or con-
structive consensual relationship where the mineral lessee has no
tionship stemming from its extensive mineral leases with the tribe, even though the
employment issue and mineral contracts were not directly related); Babbitt Ford, Inc. v.
Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 593-94 (1983).
,4 UNC Resources v. Benally, 514 F.Supp. 358, 362-63 (D.N.M. 1981).
I41 d. at 363.




direct contractual relationship with the tribe, but merely acts
within reservation boundaries for the purpose of mining non-
Indian fee lands. 43 On the other hand, tribes have a strong
interest in generating tax revenues to support tribal governmental
services. Tax jurisdiction is premised, in part, on the notion that
a recipient of such services, such as a mineral lessee mining
within reservation boundaries, should help bear the cost of these
services.'"4
XIV. MONTANA'S SECOND EXCEPTION: PROTECTING THE
TRIBE'S POLITICAL INTEGRITY, ECONOMIC SECURITY, HEALTH,
AND WELFARE
Tribal jurisdiction to tax non-Indian activity on fee land
within reservation boundaries may not be divested where the
activity "threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.'''
45
Unquestionably, a tribe's inability to impose severance taxes
on minerals extracted from fee lands will directly impact tribal
revenues. But decreased revenues alone may not be enough to
envelop tribal severance taxes on fee lands within Montana's
second exception. Justice White, in Brendale, emphasized that
Montana states only that tribes may retain inherent sovereignty
when an outsider's activity threatens or affects the tribe.'" The
exception will not apply to every instance that impacts a tribe's
police powers, but rather only those nonmember activities which
are demonstrably serious or imperilous. 147 Application of the
exception is dependent on the circumstances of each case.' 4
Under Justice Blackmun's construction of Montana's second
exception, a tribe has jurisdiction over a non-Indian whenever a
significant tribal interest is threatened or directly affected.'4 9
141 Supra notes 135-42.
Supra notes 50-51.
'' Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981); but see Gover, Natural
Resources Development: Structuring Tribal Governments For Economic Development,
ROCKY MTN. MIN. LAw FOUNDATION, 3-25 (Jan. 1989).
11 Brendale, 492 U.S. at 429 (White, J.). Justice Blackmun disagreed with Justice
White's analysis of Montana's second exception. Id. at 459-60.
I" d. at 430-31.
' Id. at 430.
149 Id. at 456-57 (emphasis added). Justice White discredits Justice Blackmun's
analysis of Montana's second exception. Id. at 429, n. 11.
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Justice Blackmun emphasizes the geographical component of
tribal sovereignty.5 0 Where the nonmember activity is within
reservation boundaries, even though on fee land, the activity
will generally impact the tribe, and thus trigger tribal jurisdic-
tion. With respect to tribal taxation of non-Indian activity on
fee land, the Justice, relying on Merrion and Buster, stated that
tribes have such authority.''
A. Broad Applications of Montana's Second Exception
In Brendale, Justice Blackmun argued that tribal authority
to zone is "central to the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe."' 5 2 Absent a power to zone, a tribe is
precluded from developing a comprehensive land management
system." 3 Inconsistent tribal and state zoning, applied in a check-
erboard fashion, would create a zoning "nightmare, nullifying
the efforts of either sovereign to segregate incompatible land
uses. '' 1
5 4
Like Justice Blackmun, some lower courts have readily found
that nonmember activity within reservation boundaries impacted
tribal interests sufficiently to invoke tribal jurisdiction under
Montana's second exception.' Tribal jurisdiction over non-In-
SO Id. at 457.
" Brendale, 492 U.S. at 457 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130, 143 (1981), which in turn cited with approval Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th
Cir. 1905), appeal dism'd 203 U.S. 599 (1906)). Note, however, that the Merrion Court
cited Buster to support its holding that tribal tax jurisdiction stemmed from a tribe's
inherent sovereignty, in addition to a tribe's power to exclude nonmembers. The Court
in Merrion did not have reason to discuss tribal taxation on fee lands. See supra note
60. Justice Blackmun's reliance on Merrion is taken somewhat out of context.
- Brendale, 492 U.S. at 458 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
566 (1981)).
' Id. at 459-60.
"I ld. at 461.
See Babbitt Ford v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 1983)
(extending tribal jurisdiction over nonmember auto dealer trying to repossess a car where
repossession could lead to violence, or could leave a tribe member stranded, and thus
sufficiently impacted tribal health and welfare); Superior Oil v. United States 605 F.Supp.
674, 683-84 (D. Utah 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 799 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1986)
(extending tribal regulatory jurisdiction over defendant's seismic testing where tribe
retained enormous economic profit from its natural resources, and absent regulation
tribe would be unable to exclude negligent operators from the reservation); Cardin v.
DeLaCruz, 671 F.2d 363, 366 (9th Cir. 1982) (extending tribal health regulation over
non-Indian grocery business operating on the reservation). For cases that have held
Montana's second exception did not apply, see Swift Transportation v. John 546 F.
Supp. 1185, 1193 (D. Ariz. 1983) (court refused to apply Montana exception, and thus
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dians has been sustained where the activity had only a tangential
or speculative impact on the tribe's integrity, economic security,
health, or welfare.156
B. Impacting the Tribe-Comprehensive Regulatory Schemes
Tribal taxation is distinguishable from the zoning issue in
Brendale and other instances where tribe regulations have been
upheld. Jurisdiction to tax, unlike zoning and other regulatory
functions, need not be comprehensive to be effective. Denying
a tribe the authority to impose severance taxes on non-Indian
activity on one parcel of fee land will not disrupt the tribe's
general tax scheme over neighboring checkerboarded parcels.
Regardless of tribal taxing authority on fee lands or the lack
thereof, tribes retain unimpeded authority to tax the balance of
the reservation. 
157
C. Impacting the Tribe's Economic Security
Precluding tribal taxing authority over fee lands has only a
minimal indirect effect on the tribe's political integrity, health,
or welfare. It may, depending on the circumstances and the
tribe's dependency on mineral resource revenues, significantly
impact or imperil a tribe's economic security.
Many tribes rely on mineral resources as their primary source
of income."'8 Accordingly, any limits on tribal authority to reg-
ulate or tax this source of income potentially imperils tribal
economic security. At least one lower court has relied on a
there was no tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians who were involved in a car accident
on a U.S. highway within the boundaries of a reservation); United States v. Anderson,
736 F.2d 1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984) (state, not Indians, had jurisdiction to regulate
water rights appurtenant to reservation).
-' While depriving tribes of the authority to tax will no doubt negatively impact
tribal political integrity, economic security, health, and welfare, so too would deprivation
of any other governmental power. To hold that any negative impact would trigger the
exception would render Montana's general rule a nullity. Tribes must show some height-
ened impact. Justice Blackmun suggests that the exception applies where a significant
interest is directly impacted. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 457. Justice White suggests an even
higher burden and would apply the Montana exception only where the tribe's interests
are imperiled. Id. at 431.
' A tribe's political integrity, health, and welfare are impacted only indirectly in
the sense that less tax revenues decrease the tribe's ability to provide governmental
services.
"I Supra notes 32, 33, and 35.
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tribe's economic dependency on mineral wealth to sustain a
tribe's authority to regulate reservation mineral activity.5 9
D. Montana's Second Exception-Conclusion
Tribal authority to impose severance taxes on fee lands will
no doubt impact the economy of some tribes more than others.
Where the impact is serious enough to imperil the tribe, pursuant
to Montana's second exception, it will have jurisdiction to tax.'
Courts following Justice Blackmun's interpretation of the excep-
tion will not require that the impact be imperiling, but rather
will sustain tribal jurisdiction under a more limited standard. A
tribe will have taxing jurisdiction where precluding the tax would
significantly impact the tribe.'
6'
Under either approach, a court considering the impact of
the tax should do so from some objective frame of reference,
such as the percentage at which the tribe's wealth stems from
its mineral resources. An objective approach will provide both
tribes and mineral lessees with some guidelines from which they
can predict the circumstances granting a tribe tax jurisdiction.
XV. JUSTICE STEVENS' ANALYSIS IN BRENDALE-DOES HIS
DEMOGRAPHIC APPROACH APPLY TO TRIBAL TAXATION?
Under Justice Stevens' demographic analysis, tribal zoning
jurisdiction over fee lands within reservation boundaries stems
from the tribe's power to exclude non-Indians. 62 Tribal jurisdic-
tion to tax within the reservation also stems in part from the
tribe's power to exclude, but ultimately it derives from the tribe's
power as a sovereign.
63
It follows from Justice Stevens' analysis in Merrion and
Brendale that if a tribe imposes taxes grounded in its power to
- Superior Oil v. United States, 605 F.Supp. 674, 683-84 (D. Utah 1985), rev'd
on other grounds, 799 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1986).
,1 Where a tribe's interests are imperiled, both Justice White's construction of the
Montana exception, Brendale, 492 U.S. at 431, and Justice Blackmun's construction,
id. at 452, are satisfied.
,6, Brendale, 492 U.S. at 431 (exception applies whenever significant tribal interest
is threatened or directly impacted).
1' Id. at 432-33.
,61 See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe. 455 U.S. 130, 137-38 (1982). Note that
the Merrion Court's analysis of the power to exclude is dicta, since the Court's holding




exclude, that power will likely extend only to "closed" portions
of the reservation. On portions of the reservation where a tribe
no longer retains its power to exclude, it is likely that its juris-
diction to tax must be rooted in other sources of tribal power.
61
A. Power to Exclude-Application to Tribal Taxation
Justice Stevens' demographic approach, which turned the
tide in Brendale, will not likely have the same impact on the
tribal severance tax issue. Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Mer-
rion, argued that tribes, by entering agreements with mineral
lessees, lost the power to exclude the lessees from the reserva-
tion. 165 In the typical situation, a mineral lessee mining or drilling
on fee land within the reservation likely also may be operating
on neighboring checkerboarded tribal trust lands. Under Justice
Stevens' analysis, where a tribe enters a leasing agreement, it
defeats its power to exclude the mineral lessee. Absent a power
to exclude, demographic analysis, which is rooted in whether
the tribe has the power to exclude, becomes a moot point.
B. Power to Exclude-If Applicable, Where to Draw the
Line
Should a court accept Justice Stevens' approach even in light
of his dissent in Merrion, it will likely prove difficult to apply.
Justice Stevens provides no benchmarks by which a tribe or
mineral lessee can gauge the character of each portion of the
reservation. '6 Accordingly, economic development of tribal lands
may be inhibited where the fee lands are in the gray areas that
are not clearly definable as either "closed" or "open." In these
areas, neither the tribe nor the non-Indian mineral lessee can
assuredly plan on the tribe's jurisdiction to tax.
Cotton Petroleum, an opinion penned by Justice Stevens just
two months prior to Brendale, suggests that in the gray area
tribal taxing authority may be greater than other forms of tribal
authority over non-Indians. 67 In Cotton Petroleum, the Court
upheld state severance taxes within reservation boundaries.," The
'" See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 444-46 (Stevens, J.) See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137-44.
61 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 186.
- Brendale, 492 U.S. at 464-65 (Blackmun, 1.) (disagreeing with Justice Stevens'
analysis).
See Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
6 Id. at 184-88.
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state had jurisdiction to tax on the reservation where it had
provided governmental services to both the tribe and the mineral
lessees, and where the state's tax was not unduly burdensome
on the tribe. 169 The Court did not require that the state's taxes
equate with the value of the state-provided services. 70 Nor did
the Interstate Commerce Clause require that the state and tribal
tax be apportioned in relationship to the services provided by
each.' 7 ' Rather, where both the tribe and the state provided
services, and the activity took place within both sovereigns'
borders, both had taxing power even though it subjected the
mineral lessee to a multiple tax burden.
Cotton Petroleum, which questioned a state's jurisdiction to
tax Indian lands within the reservation, is the flip side of the
issue of tribal jurisdiction to tax fee lands within the reservation.
If the same rule applies when reversing sovereigns, then follow-
ing Cotton Petroleum, a tribe will have tax jurisdiction over
those portions of the reservation where it provides tribal services.
Typically, sustaining tribal tax jurisdiction on the basis of
whether the tribe provides governmental services will mirror the
result under the demographic approach.17  Most likely, on
"closed" portions of a reservation, where the population and
cultural identity is predominantly Indian, the tribe will provide
governmental services and thus will have jurisdiction to tax. On
"open" portions of a reservation, where a large percentage of
non-Indians define the nature of the area and tribal govern-
mental services are primarily utilized by tribal members, the
tribe will be precluded from imposing taxes. 7 a
Where the surrounding land is in the gray area between
"closed" and "open," the holding in Cotton Petroleum suggests
that tribal tax jurisdiction may be greater than the extent of the
- Id. at 188-92.
17o Id. at 189-90. See supra note 60.
171 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 190-91.
1" Justice Stevens, dissenting in Merrion, based his opinion on the tribe's power
to exclude nonmembers. Merrion v. Jicarilla Indian Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 159 (1982)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). It follows that Justice Stevens would apply his demographic
analysis to tribal jurisdiction to tax fee lands should the tribe be able to get past his
primary contention in Merrion that the tribe, by entering leasing agreements, had given
up its power to exclude.
-, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 455-56 (1982). Describing the "open portion" of a reservation, Justice Stevens
states the "government services provided by the tribe-although theoretically available
to all residents-are in practice generally used only by members of the Tribe." Id.
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tribe's zoning jurisdiction in Brendale.174 Zoning involves the
power to define the character of an area.'17 Taxing involves the
power to raise revenues to meet the costs of government. It is
probable that a tribe will provide governmental services even in
those areas where it no longer has the ability to define the
character. In those areas, the tribe's interest in taxing is greater
than its interest in zoning. Even though the tribe no longer has
the ability to maintain the Indian character of the locale, it still
has the need to generate revenues to enable it to provide serv-
ices. 176 Thus, a court applying Justice Stevens' demographic ap-
proach to a taxing jurisdiction question may need to look beyond
the tribe's ability to define the essential character of the area.
This standard, directly applicable to zoning, has less of a nexus
with tribal taxation, and it may leave the tribe short of funds
necessary to meet the costs of government.
XVI. CONCLUSION
A court considering a tribe's authority to tax non-Indian
mineral lessees mining fee land would do well to follow Justice
White's analysis in Brendale. As a general principle, tribes are
divested of their power over non-Indian activity on fee lands,
including the power to tax. To not follow Justice White's anal-
ysis is to ignore the Supreme Court's ruling in Montana.
77
Accepting Montana's general principle, the issue becomes
whether tribal severance taxes on fee lands fit within Montana's
exceptions. Current federal policy in favor of tribal economic
autonomy and the likelihood that mineral lessees may benefit
from tribal governmental services suggest a broad construction
of the consensual relationship exception. Counterbalancing these
interests is the mineral lessee's minimal protection in state or
federal court against abusive tribal taxation. The mineral lessee's
lack of protection, outside those remedies available in tribal
court, the tribe's potential conflict of interest as both lessor and
taxing sovereign, and the fact that the mineral lessee has not
" See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
' Brendale, 492 U.S. at 423.
' Id. at 444-45. This need is especially so in light of the fact that tribal taxes do
not preempt a state's taxes, or need to be apportioned with them. Id. at 445.
11 Cf. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 455-56 (J. Blackmun). Justice Blackmun's conclusion
that the Court in Montana merely "missed its usual way" is a feeble attempt to reconcile
Montana with other tribal jurisdiction decisions.
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directly entered a consensual relationship with the tribe lead to
the conclusion that the typical mineral lessee will not fall within
the consensual relationship exception.
A tribe stands a better chance of asserting tax jurisdiction
through Montana's second exception. Tribes that rely extensively
on natural resources as a source of income may likely suffer
imperiling economic impact if denied the opportunity to tax. In
light of congressional policy urging the development of tribal
economies, and in particular development of tribal mineral re-
sources, a court may likely look benignly at tribal claims assert-
ing that, without jurisdiction to impose severance taxes, their
economic security is imperiled.
Of course, if tribes must rely on Montana's second exception,
tribal jurisdiction to impose severance taxes will depend on the
particular facts and circumstances of each assertion of tribal tax
authority. Thus, the courts must more clearly delineate the guide-
lines under which Montana's second exception applies. Other-
wise, neither tribe nor mineral lessee can assuredly forecast tribal
jurisdiction to tax into its mineral development plan. Of course,
tribal jurisdiction to tax could be greatly simplified if Congress
would address tribal tax jurisdiction like it has other areas.'
Unfortunately, as yet, Congress has not acted.
Michael Layne Carrico
I' See, e.g. supra note 9.
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